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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, commentary on and inquiries into the nature of
contract have been constrained in two ways. First, theorizing has
been limited to what may be called the micro-level, concerned with
contract, promise, expectation and reliance in the context of either a
bargained-for exchange or action in reliance induced by a promise.
Any changes of substance or emphasis made by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code reflect only micro-level concerns. Secondly and relatedly, certain specialized kinds of contract, such as insurance, corporation, partnership, labor, etc., have acquired sufficient
importance to become, for the most part, subjects for specialized
study. Despite the impact of Article 2, contract has seemed, to some
at least, to be contracting to the point of expiring.
Macneil's work bucks both these trends and is expansionary in
two ways. First, it is not limited to the micro-level. Indeed, microand macro-levels are seen merely as different areas on a continuum.
Second, and consequently, it brings back into the contract fold all
the specialized spin-offs mentioned above and much more besides.
At the heart of Macneil's new paradigm of contract is the notion of an exchange relation, the theoretical inspiration for which
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seems to be derived from sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber;
the enterprise is one of social analysis. As a result, the point of view
is essentially external; we are told what the true reality of contract
is from that theoretical point of view. My main purpose is to look at
that true reality from another, internal, point of view. Macneil has
offered a sociology of contract, I am offering a hermeneutics of what
he perceives contract to be.
A word about the hermeneutic approach. If one takes the true
reality as presented by Macneil, one may then, as Kelsen might
have put it, represent its meaning from another point of view.
Macneil has described contractual behavior; I shall offer a theory of
what that behavior means from the viewpoint of the participants. In
doing so, I shall draw on the insights of Hume, Austin and Grice, the
foremost practitioners of hermeneutics in English. Hart does
something similar in The Concept of Law: he seeks to understand
law in terms of what the social practices which manifest its existence mean to the participants. Hence his emphasis on the internal
as well as the external aspects and points of view. Similarly, I wish
to explicate the internal aspect of the exchange relation. Indeed, it
is my claim that the essentially external point of view of Macneil
may be complemented by an internal point of view which reveals
the Gricean meaning of the behavior described to those participating in it.
What follows is an attempt to bring a hermeneutical approach
to contract qua exchange relation at both the micro- and macrolevels.
MACNEIL'S THESIS

The social institution of contract is defined in terms of what
are called its primal roots-specialization of labor and exchange,
choice and awareness of the future.1 Its function is that of projecting
exchange into the future, and it is manifested in contractual relations. Contract is thus the relations of parties to the processes of
projecting exchange into the future, and is not limited to promise in
exchange. Indeed, promise is only a fragment of any contractual
relation no matter how discrete. The projection referred to
emanates from combining in a society the three primal roots of
specialization of labor, choice, and awareness of the future. The
1.

Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 1.
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980). These works are the primary sources
relied on in this section.
MACNEIL, THE
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behavior involved in contractual relations gives rise to prescriptive
norms and standards of proper conduct.
Promise in exchange is defined as the present communication
of a commitment to engage in a reciprocal measured exchange. Nonpromissory exchange projectors are custom, status, habit, command,
and expectations regarding the status quo.
A contrast-ideal or theoretical, rather than real-is drawn
between discrete transaction contracts or contractual behavior and
relational contractual behavior: all contractual behavior is in fact
relational to some extent; the truly pure discrete transaction is a fiction. A (primarily) discrete exchange transaction is a measured
reciprocal exchange, such as a simple exchange of goods, and the
projector is typically a promise. But promises are always accompanied by other non-promissory projectors of exchange. Relational
contracts are based on contractual relations which are essentially
exchange relations, and are not limited to promise in exchange.
Modern contractual relations cover such things as a childless
marriage, IBM, UAW-GM, a Macdonald's franchise and a shop with
two employees. Clearly, "exchange relation" is a concept of high
generality; and Macneil emphasizes that an exchange relation,. such
as those mentioned above, is not just "a bunch of discrete transactions." Moreover, contractual behavior is not limited to that
behavior denoted by contract law.
This is quite revolutionary. All revolutions need a new
paradigm and a new vocabulary. Macneil provides both. In place of
the discrete transaction characterized by promise, the paradigm of
classical theory, we are offered the notion of an exchange relation
which embraces at one pole the classical paradigm and at the other
the nation-state qua massive ongoing exchange relation. Exchange
relation is the new paradigm; and the message is that contract
ought to be regarded as coextensive with contractual behavior qua
exchange relation-which does not necessarily involve promise.
Thus, there is a claim which is both empirical and normative: contractual behavior extends far beyond the classical paradigm; and
there is a recommendation that contract be regarded as coextensive
with the true reality of contractual behavior.
The new vocabulary for the new paradigm of exchange relation
is provided by the expressions introduced to characterize the contrasting notions of discrete transaction and ongoing exchange relation. For the former, Macneil reactivates the old word "presentiation": the discrete transaction denies the future by pulling it into
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the present; the ongoing exchange relation, on the other hand,
futurizes the present by projecting it into the future. Contractual
behavior should be thought of not only as presentiation but also as
the projection of exchange into the future. So conceived, it covers
not only promise, but also command, status, social role, kinship,
bureaucratic patterns, religious obligations, and habits. Moreover,
while it covers promise qua futurizing the present, Macneil stresses
that promise is not necessary for the ongoing exchange relation, the
new paradigm of projecting exchange into the future.
THE MEANING OF CONVENTIONAL ACTION

Contractual behavior involves linguistic behavior, talkexchange, communication, promising, and exchanging. All these are
forms of action and their meaning is the meaning of a certain kind of
action. That meaning is essentially Gricean and that action is conventional in the Humean sense.
H.P. Grice's theory of 'non-natural' meaning -utterer's meaning
rather than word meaning-deals neither with lexical meaning, nor
with functional classification, nor with sense and reference, intension or extension, but with utterer's use in the context of talkexchange, communication and conversation, the pragmatic and instrumental dimensions of meaning.!
What sets the Gricean idea of communication apart from other
modes of social interaction is that when a speaker, S,attempts a bit
of communication with an audience (hearer) H,
i)
S intends to produce in H some response, R, and
ii) S intends H to recognize that i), and
iii) S intends H to produce R on the basis (partly, at least) of H's
recognition of ii) and so of i).
And to avoid certain potential counter-examples, Grice adds, in effect,
iv) S has no relevant hidden intentions.
Communication and talk-exchange thus deal with meaning in the
context of utterances, the process or activity of language-using, as
contrasted with (word) meaning in the context of inscriptions, the
products of language using. Utterer's meaning is concerned with
what J.L. Austin called "the total speech-act in the total speech
2. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957); Grice, Utterer'sMeaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REV. 147 (1969); Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND
SEMANTICS 46 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds. 1975). See also Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 83 PHIL. REV. 439 (1964).
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situation on a particular occasion";' and the meaning of that, i.e., the
meaning in use in a non-null context, is a function of its illocutionary
force, the Gricean intentions of the utterer, S, and the word meaning of the locution on which the speech-act is based. Meaning in this
sense is therefore a matter of the psychological state the speaker, S,
intends his hearer (H) to think he (S)is in by virtue of his (H's)
recognition of his (S's) intention. This sort of interaction, it must be
remembered, could not be fulfilled with any regularity in a social
group, without some cooperative trust among members of the group.
And this brings us to Hume.
Communication, language-using, promising, using money, exchanging, dancing, playing games, co-operative or coordinated action
generally-all are examples of conventional action in the Humean
sense: "The actions of each of us have a reference to those of the
other, and are perform'd upon the supposition that something is to
be perform'd on the other part." And this is so, "tho' without the interposition of a promise." Thus, "[t]wo men, who pull the oars of a
boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never
given promises to each other."' Both conventional action and a convention are solutions to coordination problems in Lewis' sense.'
It is conventions that make social life possible; and conventional action depends on our being in agreement about
something-in the case of communication, the practical necessity of
truthfulness; in the case of promising, the practical necessity of performing-which, of course, does not require that an agreement has
been made in the sense of giving promises to each other. Our being
in agreement about a certain kind of co-operative or co-ordinated action is what is meant by a convention; and the action typically
covered thereby is what I shall call conventional action. But not all
conventional action manifests a convention, nor, as we shall see,
need a convention be about conventional action.
The essential feature of any kind of conventional action is (nonaccidental) interpersonal mutuality of reference at the level of intentions (not, pace Macneil, consent): the self-conscious rower intends
his strokes to co-ordinate with those of the other rower, which are
intended to co-ordinate with his. In the case of talk-exchange, the
mutuality or self-reference gets more complex, as we have seen.
And in all cases the intentions are to be explicated in Gricean terms.
3.
4.
5.

J. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).
D. LEwis, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
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Following Searle, the Gricean intentions of S qua promisor may be
stated as follows:
when S says to H, explicitly or implicitly,
I promise to do A in circumstances C,
S intends to undertake an obligation to do A in C;
S intends, by virtue of his utterance, to be taken by H to
undertake an obligation to do A in C;
(iii) S intends that H recognize (i) and (ii);8 and
(iv) S has no relevant hidden intentions.
(i)
(ii)

Does exchanging imply promising? If it does then logically, at
least, the exchange relation theory reduces to the classical promissory theory, provided that Macneil's exchange relation does not
extend beyond what may be called intended exchanges. Only the
philosopher Prichard appears to have addressed himself specifically
to the question; he argued that "even exchanging one thing for
another seems to involve [bilateral] promising."' In fact, his argument seems to support the stronger conclusion that a simple (intended) exchange entails or presupposes bilateral promises even though
neither party uttered the words "I promise-" prior to or at the
time of the exchange. But how could a simple swap of an apple for a
banana entail or presuppose promises?
Well, following Prichard, we start by supposing that S has an
apple and H has a banana and that S believes he will gain by giving
up his apple and getting H's banana in return, and so is moved to
give up his apple in return for the banana. But S will not give up his
apple unless he can gain H's banana by doing so. Hence S resolves:
if you (H) will hand over your banana to me (S), I (S)will hand over
my apple to you (H). But I (S)will not do so without some assurance
that you (H) will hand over your banana; and you (H) will not do the
latter without some assurance that I (S) will hand over my apple.
Hence, we may imagine that S says to H: if you (H) will promise to
hand over your banana on my (S)promise to hand over my apple,
then I (S)promise to hand over my apple to you (H). So you (H) promise to hand over your banana. But it is not until after H has so
promised that S has an obligation to hand over his apple. And it is
not until after S has handed over his apple that H has an obligation
to hand over his banana. Thus, a simple intended swap implies promises and obligations which are future (because conditional) in rela6. J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969). This account is modified when the
promisor is not sincere, i.e., when condition (iv) is not satisfied.
7. H. Prichard, Exchanging, in MORAL OBLIGATIONS (1968).
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tion to the promises; hence the promises implied are conceptually
prior to the actual swap, and so are presuppositions of the intended
exchange.'
This is very much like a Gricean explanation of the meaning of
an exchange qua conventional action: what S does depends on what
H does, and what H does depends on what S does. But if neither S
nor H actually utters the words, "I promise _
," can we imply promises? Well, courts of law have no problem with implied promises.
And to say that exchange implies promises is to say that exchange
intensionally includes promises. However, not all conventional action
is an intended exchange in Prichard's sense so it cannot be said, on
the basis of Prichard's argument, that all conventional action implies
promises (as Hume recognized).
Can there be an intended exchange of things even without implied promises? Macneil has several answers. First, he says that a
completely present exchange would not be what he calls a contract
because there is no projection of exchange into the future.' On this
view, he rejects or fails to appreciate Prichard's analysis. Secondly,
to the question: Is a sale of goods a contract? he gives the clear
answer: "Yes. No."'" However, when discussing a gas purchase at a
filling station (i.e., an exchange of goods for cash) he says it "inevitably involves some credit, either the tank is filled first before
payment or after; in either case credit, and with it promise,
occurs."'1 This clearly can be spelled out according to Prichard's
analysis. Macneil refers to the promise in this case as a 'hidden element,"' another way of saying that the promise is implied rather
than express-which presupposes that promises (legally, at least)
may be either express or implied.
On another occasion, Macneil mentions the so-called silent trade
of some primitive people. A modern version of this would be the
vending machine. As Macneil notes, "the very fact that the parties
do not communicate other than by leaving and collecting goods at a
given point out of each other's presence presupposes an element of
8. This paragraph departs from Pritchard (supra note 7) to the extent that i)
the order of performance does not determine the analysis, and ii) it generalizes from
what Pritchard regarded as the analysis applicable "where my [S] action need not
come first."
9. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, supra note 1, at 781.
10. I. Macneil, Values in Contractual Relations 1 n.2 (1981 Draft) (unpublished
manuscript).
11. Id. at 6 n.10.
12. Id.
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trust that can have evolved only by repeated transactions." The
"silent trade" is offered by Macneil as an example of an apparently
and relatively pure discrete transaction which nevertheless is "not
transactional in all respects" because of "the element of trust that
can have evolved only by repeated transactions."1 Two comments
are in order. First, although not transactional in all respects, does
Macneil think that the silent trade, like the purchase of gas, has a
hidden element of promise? If he does he surely is wrong. This
raises a second point. It is not accurate to say that the "element of
trust . . .can have evolved only by repeated transactions," for that
would not be true of the first silent trade. The latter would have required i) a pre-existing climate of mutual trust in general, or ii) a
prior agreement of some sort or iii) a calculated risk by the first
Iseller'. Once the silent trade is established, then its underlying legal
theory is not the implied promise of Prichard but the notion of conditional consent of the 'seller' to the taking by the 'buyer', as
developed in the law of larceny. This is most clear in the case of
newspapers sold on the 'honor system'. Thus the silent trade is a
case of an intended exchange which is not amenable to a Prichardian
analysis. Is the silent trade a case of what I have called conventional
action on the model of two men rowing a boat?
There is a certain ambiguity between the Humean notions of
convention, conventional action and social (conventional) artifice.
Convention is the social mechanism that makes society possible; the
social artifices (property, promise and government) are those conventions which serve the public interest and give rise to the artificial virtues of honesty, fidelity and obedience. The basic notion is
conventional action in which "the actions of each of us have a
reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition that something is to be perform'd on the other part." 14 Examples are rowing, speaking a natural language, using money, as
well as recognizing the social artifices analysed in terms of convention. This mutual reference of (conventional) action is accompanied
by a general sense of common interest.
But Hume blurs the lines between recognizing the utility of a
co-operative and conventional scheme and recognizing that it is a
case of cooperation (rowing) or convention proper (language, money).
The latter, the real conventions, involve not only the mere fact of
'agreement in action' or cooperation, but also the explicit recognition

13.
14.

Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, supra note 1, at 781 n.19.
D. HUME, supra note 4, at 490.
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that one of many possible ways to cooperate is the agreed one.
Hume notes this in the case of those conventions which he calls the
social artifices when he says they are changeable by public will.
Thus rowing, while conventional action in the sense of co-ordinated
action, could not amount to a convention unless it was a highly
stylized kind of rowing.
As Lewis has shown, 5 a regularity in conventional or nonconventional action will amount to a convention if and only if there
is common knowledge among those whose behavior it regulates that:
i)
everyone conforms to it;
ii) everyone expects everyone else to conform to it;
iii) everyone prefers to conform to it on condition that others do,
since conformity to it solves a coordination problem; and
iv) they would conform to a different regularity if others conformed to it.
The rowers presumably would not satisfy condition (iv) (though
Lewis seems to think they would),"6 whereas users of a natural
language and a monetary system do satisfy it. And the social artifice
of promise satisfies the definition also. The point to note is that not
all conventional action rises to the status of convention. Moreover,
conventions which become habits serve as rules and may generate
their own constitutive and regulative rules.
Conventional action so understood applies to everything from
promise to the extremes of Macneil's notion of an exchange relation.
Both action which recognizes the social artifice of promise analysed
in terms of convention as defined above, and two men rowing a boat
in a way not amounting to a convention, are cases of conventional
action as I use that expression.
The mutual reference of one rower's (or speaker's) intentions to
those of another, when accompanied by common knowledge that the
intentions are thus mutually referring, makes each participant's intention ultimately self-referential. The self-conscious rower intends
his strokes to coordinate with those of the other rower which are intended to coordinate with his. And similarly with Grice's utterer
and hearer, and Searle's promisor and promisee qua standard participants in the common convention of promise.
Both conventional action sans convention and convention de-

15. See D. LEWIs, supra note 5. This way of stating Lewis' definition is due to
Annette C. Baier.
16. Id. at 44.
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fined as above are solutions to coordination problems without any
explicit or necessarily implied promises. The silent trade is
therefore a case of conventional action: the vendor "declares": if you
will put 25c in the cup, I consent to your taking (you have my permission to take) a paper; and the buyer "declares": if you consent to
(permit) my taking a paper, I will put 25¢ in the cup.
Thus, exchanging is a kind of conventional action which does
not necessarily imply promises. If all exchanging is contractual
behavior and all contractual behavior involves exchange, then
Hume's notion of conventional action gives a philosophical explanation of contractual behavior between autonomous individuals. But
Macneil does not believe that the notion of an autonomous individual
is a useful tool for social analysis. Convention itself is clearly involved in that part of contractual behavior covered by what Macneil
calls classical contract theory- exchanges of goods predicated upon
an exchange of promises or an exchange of goods for a promise. And
both conventional action and convention may be involved at the
limits of Macneil's notion of contractual behavior. On the other hand,
as we shall see, section 90 (promissory estoppel) may be regarded as
a convention only in so far as the behavior it refers to is conventional action. To the extent that section 90 behavior is not conventional, it will not generate a relational contract if the latter is
limited to conventional action; the fact that Macneil's exchange relation generates a reliance norm does not affect this point." These and
other matters will now be considered in more detail.
CONVENTIONAL ACTION AND CONTRACT: MICRO-LEVEL

In classical theory, what the parties do, if a contract is to be
formed, must have the Gricean meaning of offer and acceptance,
which have the following (reversible) forms respectively:
(a) Offer: If you (H) will do B, I (S) promise to do A.
(b) Acceptance: H does B. 8
The offer, it will be noted, is a conditional promise and the condition
is a request. When H satisfies that request (does B) in response to
that request we have an intended exchange, H thereby accepts S's
offer and also furnishes the consideration for S's promise, making it
unconditional and so amenable to legal enforcement-unless such
things as mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionability,
duress, lack of contractual capacity, donative intent, illegality, etc.,
17.
18.

See text section Convention & Contract: Macro-level infra.
In the case of a bilateral contract, "doing B" is promising something.
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can be shown.'" Consideration is therefore legally sufficient to constitute (a) and (b) a contract which is legally enforceable unless ....
We may therefore explicate the doctrine of consideration as
follows: given (a), a promise by S to H on condition that H fulfill a
request of S, the satisfaction, (b), of that condition by H qua
response to S's request constitutes the consideration." It is only
when the satisfaction of the sufficient condition of an offer (a) itself
is questioned that a genuine issue of consideration is raised: questions involving "unless factors" can properly arise only if we have
already determined that (b) constitutes consideration for (a). Contract formation itself is thus conventional action constituting an exchange involving a promise on the part of at least one of the two
parties.
Concern for the reliance, as contrasted with expectation, interest led to the extension of legally enforceable promises beyond
those supported by consideration. Thus, section 90 provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise."
A section 90 transaction' will thus have two components:
(a') a promise made by S, and
(b') something done by H,
such that (b') is an objectively foreseeable (causal?) consequence of
(a'). This compares interestingly with our notion of conventional action, the essence of which is interpersonal mutuality of reference at
the level of intentions, requiring conduct with a Gricean meaning
having the (reversible) form:
if you do (will do) something,
then I will do something.
19. Joking on the other hand, could mean there was no offer and/or acceptance, depending who was joking. This notion of "unless factors" draws on Hart's concept of defeasibility. See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49
PROCDGS. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 171 (1948-49).
20. Whence, "[i]f the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of ...detriment to the promisee," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 81, nor, for that matter, of benefit to the promisor.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90. Section 90 uses the word
"induce." Even though it may be doubted whether inducing is a casual relation, contract law does not seem to draw a distinction between the two notions. See §§ 115,
118, 200.
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This is clearly satisfied by classical offer, acceptance and consideration.
The illustrations in section 90 indicate that the relevant promise (of S) may be conditional, as in:
(al If you (H) graduate in June, I (S) promise to pay you $1000.
(bl H graduates in June.
The promise of (a') may be enforceable under section 90 and the
transaction will involve conventional action if the context indicates
bilateral Gricean intentions. On the other hand, the form: since you
(H) did B, I (S) promise to do A, appears to be the converse of both a
section 90 transaction and our notion of conventional action; as such,
it does not fit our notion of an exchange relation. This does not
mean, of course, that a gratitude context could not lead to an exchange relation defined by conventional action.
Suppose that the promise of (al is unconditional, as in (al I (S)
promise to pay you (H) $1000 on Friday, and (b') H buys an
automobile, where (a') occurs on Monday and (b') on Tuesday. Suppose also that S and H are 'complete strangers' and there is no preexisting exchange relation, no status or role relation, no basis for
gratitude on the part S, and S has no known reputation for making
purely gratuitous promises. In such a case, it could be that (b'
reasonably was not action in reliance on (a' and that justice did not
require the enforcement of (a'. Nor would we have conventional action. On the other hand, given a suitable context, 0, such as a preexisting exchange relation, etc., a section 90 transaction with unconditional (a') would probably be enforceable. It would not, however,
constitute conventional action unless the context, 4,, were such as to
impart to (a' and (b' the relevant Gricean meaning-intentions.
Thus, only those section 90 transactions having the form: if you
(H) do B, I (S) promise to do A, are clearly capable of being
conventional-action exchange relations; any section 90 transaction of
the form: since you (H) did B, I (S) promise to do A, cannot be a
conventional-action exchange relation; and in the case of a section 90
transaction with unconditional (a'), the context 4 will determine
whether it is a conventional-action exchange relation or not. For
Macneil, however, any section 90 transaction is an exchange relation
even though it fits the 'gratitude' pattern or even though the promise of (a') is unconditional and the social context 4 is insufficient to
impart the Gricean meaning-intentions necessary for conventional
action. This is because, as we have already noted, Macneil does not
believe that the notion of an autonomous individual is a useful tool
for social analysis.
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A conventional-action exchange relation thus captures classical
theory, but not necessarily all of section 90. Its extension is
therefore less than that of Macneil's notion of an exchange relation,
even at the micro-level.
CONVENTION & CONTRACT: MACRO-LEVEL

Convention & Customary Law
Macneil also acknowledges that his notion of relational contract
(coextensive with contractual behavior) encompasses the nation-state
itself as a massive contract relation. This is consistent with contractual behavior qua conventional action: the modern state may be
viewed as a solution. to the most important and comprehensive of all
coordination problems. Macneil appears to be unaware of a
remarkably similar claim made by Fuller on the basis of section 90
as the model for customary law, conceived as a language of social interaction,, as being the heart of all modern legal systems.'
Rather than just a topic of anthropological study of primitive
societies, customary law is a language of interaction, a stable set of
expectancies, a program for living together. Not only is it essential
to our understanding of enacted and adjudicative law (the base lines
of customary law), it is in fact necessary for their existence. All the
various substantive and procedural areas of law serve primarily to
set the terms of people's relations among each other; they facilitate
human interaction even when they include restraints as well as
enabling provisions. In developing his theory, Fuller points to and
argues for a close analogy between contract law and customary law
in general, and then takes as his model for customary law a
generalization of section 90.
Customary law is at home across the entire spectrum of social
contexts, which range from the most intimate (the family) to the
most hostile (enemies), with the most open (the middle ground occupied by friendly strangers), the area where contract and, statute
are most at home.
Fuller takes contract law, in the sense of the 'law' made by a
contract, as the model for customary law in general, and proposes a
definition of customary law based on section 90. Enacted law,
according to Fuller, shares the middle (open) ground of social contexts with contract. This area, populated by friendly strangers, is
22. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 171 (R.
Wolff ed. 1971).
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characterized by an open relation not prestructured by the bonds of
kinship or the repulsions of shared hostility which are the marks of
the two extremes of the social context spectrum. In the middle area,
the basic necessity is to impose rules that will serve to set limitations (base lines) which people must observe in their interactions
with one another, leaving them free, within those limitations, to pursue their own goals. Thus, law must deal with defined (kinds of) action, not with dispositions of will or attitudes of mind. Enacted law
combines with the organizational principles implicit in customary
law; these principles create an effective ordering by silent processes
reflecting neither the individual's moral sense nor the threat of
sanctions.
Generalizing from section 90, Fuller offers the following "principle," an alternative to the notion (opinio necessitatis)of repetitive
actions motivated by a sense of obligation, as the test for the creation and existence of customary law.
Where, by his actions toward B, A has (whatever his actual intention) given B reasonably to understand that he
(A) will in the future in similar situations act in a similar
manner, and B has in some substantial way prudently adjusted his affairs to the expectation that A will in future
act in accordance with this expectation, then A is bound
to follow the pattern set by his past actions toward B.
[emphasis added]
This creates an obligation by A to B, a two-party customary law, as
in making a contract. If the pattern of interaction followed by A and
B spreads through the community, then a rule of general customary
law will have been created and will become part of a complex network of reciprocal expectations, i.e., a system of customary law.
Here, then, is Fuller's 'test' for a language of interaction, a
stable set of interactional expectancies, a program for living
together, an explication of what he calls "complementary expectancies." It seems as if Fuller is striving towards but not reaching the
Hume-Lewis notion of convention. Indeed, there is an awareness of
the distinction I have drawn between conventional action and convention itself. But his section 90 model is fatally defective, in part, I
believe, because he characterizes the middle ground of the spectrum
of social contexts as being open and occupied by .friendly strangers.
Moreover, even if his section 90 model did capture the essence of
Hume-Lewis convention, it is hardly sufficient to explain social or
moral obligation: Hume had to invoke utility and disinterested sym-
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pathy; and Dworkin has plausibly argued that we must find a principle underlying a social practice if it is to impose a social obligation.M
However, Fuller is surely correct in emphasizing that we need
something more than mere behavioral uniformity to explain the existence of customary law, at least in so far as it is constitutive of
social practices or conventions. Unfortunately, while the insight is
there, the theory proposed is inadequate. Section 90, we recall, is an
alternative to the Holmes-Williston notion of consideration (enshrined in section 75)2" as the mark of a legally enforceable contract,
a sufficient condition for a promise to be legally enforceable. As
already noted, the essence of consideration, what Holmes called
M
"reciprocal conventional inducement,""
may be stated as follows:
Given a promise by A to B on condition that B fulfill a request of A, the satisfaction of that condition by B in
response to A's request constitutes the consideration for
A's promise.
Section 90, on the other hand, requires no more than
i)
ii)

a promise made by A, and
something done by B,

6
such that ii) is an objectively foreseeable (causal?)"
consequence of
(i). There is a promise by A. But instead of something done by B in
response to a request by A which is a condition of A's promise, section 90 merely requires action in reliance by B, which need only be
causally connected with A's promise. As we have already noted, at
the micro-level, a section 90 transaction may or may not constitute a
conventional-action exchange relation.

Fuller correctly states that mere regularity of behavior is insufficient to constitute customary law; something more is needed.
That something more, he thinks, is to be found in section 90, the
essence of which he thinks is captured in his principle of customary
law. But then the connection between A's action and B's action need
only be causal: A's intentions are stated to be irrelevant and B's intentions are not even mentioned. Hence B's action in relation to A's
action need only be objectively forseeable. There is no glimmer of
Hume's insight that in order for a social practice to arise from the
23.
24.
25.
26.

R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 75.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90.
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actions of A and B, what each does must be explainable by reference
to what the other does which refers back to what the first does: that
what each does must manifest the Gricean intention: if you (will) do
so and so, I will do so and so. As noted earlier, conventional action
requires mutuality of reference at the level of intentions: the selfconscious rower intends his strokes to coordinate with those of the
other which are intended to coordinate with his. But instead of this
subjective reciprocity of interpersonal mutuality of reference of
coordinated behavior, Fuller can offer no more than the objective
foreseeability associated with causation. Moreover, a general practice cannot, as Fuller seems to think, be understood simply as the
sum of a large number of separately explainable actions.
Fuller's section 90 model operating in the area occupied by
friendly strangers is not even suitable for what is called a pure coordination problem in which two or more agents have no real conflicts
of interest but need to find the pattern of combined action that will
be most advantageous to each separately. And it can in no way explain, as Hume's convention does, how a social practice could arise in
a social context marked by partially conflicting interests. To see
this, let us first consider the Prisoners' Dilemma, the classic model
of a partial conflict problem: a Humean convention, we must
remember, comes into existence, i.e., evolves, not to solve a pure
coordination problem but to solve a partial conflict problem. In the
Prisoner's Dilemma, there is conflict because the pay-offs to the
prisoners (players) differ in such a way that each can gain an advantage at the expense of the other; but it is partial because it is not a
zero-sum game: some possible outcomes are better than others for
both players taken separately.
The dilemma arises as follows. Prisoners A and B are thought
to have committed a major crime but the prosecutor has only sufficient evidence to convict them of some lesser offense. He deals with
the problem by placing the prisoners in a situation in which they
will feel constrained to confess to the major crime even though if
they refrain from confessing they cannot be convicted. A and B are
taken into custody and separated. The prosecutor then tells each
prisoner separately that
i)

if both do not confess to the major crime, each will
get one year in jail;
ii) if both confess to the major crime, each will get five
years in jail; and
iii) if one confesses, implicating the other who does not,
the confessor will be released and the other will get
ten years in jail.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/4
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In terms of years in jail, the strategic problem has the following
pay-off matrix (A's pay-off first, B's pay-off second):
B
Do not Confess
1
Do not Confess

1

(-1,

Confess

2

(0,

Confess
2

-1)

(-10,

0)

A
-10)

(-5,

-5)

From the standpoint of self-interest, the strategy of Confess for
either prisoner "strictly dominates" the strategy of Do not Confess:
A2 strictly dominates Al, and B2 strictly dominates B1. No matter
what the other prisoner is assumed to do, it is always best for this
prisoner to confess: for A, the second row is better than the first, no
matter which column he is in; and for B, the second column is better
than the first, no matter which row he is in. So their self-interest
will lead them to the lower right-hand corner of the matrix
(- 5, - 5), the equilibrium outcome, as a consequence of confession
by each, whereas they both would have been better off at the upper
left-hand corner of the matrix (- 1, - 1), the optimum outcome, the
consequence of neither confessing. Even if A and B could cooperate,
the outcome would not be affected: although they agreed (promised)
not to confess (- 1, - 1), it would still be in the interest of each to
break the agreement (- 5, - 5), irrespective of whether each
assumed the other would also break the agreement or not. Thus, the
Prisoners' Dilemma nicely captures a conflict between what seems
individually better from the standpoint of self-interest (- 1, - 1)
and what seems to produce the best overall result (- 5, - 5). It
also shows that the result of acting individually from rational
calculation (- 5, - 5) is not the most rational collective outcome.
Now let us consider once more
rowing a boat and suppose also that
and that each is lazy and selfish. Then
to be made by each, they would be
something like this:

Hume's example of two men
they want to cross the river
in terms of the physical effort
faced with a pay-off matrix
B

Do not Row
1

Row
2

Do not Row

1

(

0,

0)

( 0, -10)

Row

2

(-10,

0)

(-5, -5)

A
Each will say to himself: if the other is going to row, I prefer not
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rowing to rowing (A: (0, - 10); B: (- 10, 0)); and if the other is not
going to row, I prefer not rowing to rowing (0, 0). But then they
will not get across the river, even though, ex hypothesi, it would be
better for each on his own if they got across by sharing the work
(-5, - 5). Hence, it is necessary that they each believe that the
other would row if and only if he did so himself. But this belief is
not entailed by the argument from dominance since your decision
whether to row or not depends on mine (rather than on an assumption about my unknown-to-you decision) and I can encourage you to
row by rowing myself. This, it will be observed, is the converse of
the Prisoner's Dilemma: the result in this case of acting individually
from rational calculation (- 5, - 5) is in fact the most rational collective outcome.
Again, a contractual (promissory) agreement is not a solution
because each would have the same motive for breaking the agreement that he had before for not rowing (A: (0, - 10); B: (- 10, 0)).
Hence, we need conventional action, agreement in action without
any promises having been exchanged: each can say to himself,
"Perhaps the other will row if and only if I do." So each starts to
row and watches the other at the same time. Cooperation is then
maintained by each party's readiness to use the sanction of noncooperation: If and only if you row, I will row.
Thus, partial conflict situations can be solved without promise
or external sanctioning authority or specifically moral sentiments,
though Hume uses this pattern of social interaction to build a theory
of moral sentiment. This two-person solution can be expanded to
solve a many-person partial conflict situation by treating the latter
as made up of a series of two-person situations. In this way, the
rules constitutive of the social artifices and respect for them evolve
out of conventions and conventional action. This is so even if the
parties start from unequal bargaining positions, as long as the
resulting compromise (- 5, - 5) is to the advantage of each as compared with his own initial position.' The notion of convention thus
captures the intentions, and their motivations, which constantly
underlie and maintain a Humean system of justice and Fuller's
system of customary law: to the extent that customary law is constitutive of social practices, Hume's convention explains its esse;
Fuller's section 90 model does not.
The artificial vitues that go with the social artifices which
27.

This treatment of Hume's rowers draws on J. MACKIE, HUME'S MORAL

THEORY Ch. VI (1980).
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evolve via convention based on self-interest are expressible in the
principles conceived by Dworkin as underlying the artifices qua
social practices;28 and the rules that evolve from conventional action
and which are constitutive of those social practices form part, if not
all, of what Fuller calls customary law. Fuller's section 90 model,
having dropped the promise of section 90 itself, is left with nothing
sufficient to generate the obligations he says it creates. And Hume's
convention, which does not need promise, must be supplemented by
what he calls moral sentiment-a function of the perceived utility of
the artifices as a whole and disinterested sympathy with the public
interest-in order to create socio-moral obligations.
Convention & Social Solidarity
At the micro-level, we have noted, Macneil's exchange relation
extends beyond conventional action to section 90 transactions having a social context too general to permit the attribution of
reciprocal Gricean intentions to the participants. And at the macrolevel, a consideration of, for example, the nation-state, would, one
would think, take us even further from realistically specifiable conventional action and Gricean intentions. Indeed, at this level, we
seem to have nothing but social solidarity' to look to.
Macneil believes that Durkheim's notion of social solidarity
generated by the division of labor is the cement of the exchange
relation. It marks that cooperative trust which holds parties
together enough to prefer exchanging to killing or stealing; it exists
in a social context of partial hostility characterized by conflicting
self-interest. Indeed, to the extent that it involves limited altruism,
it conflicts with self-interest. It requires mutuality in the sense of
some kind of evenness in exchange. Restitutive law is therefore
seen as providing both the base lines and the glue of social solidarity.
Contract solidarity is social solidarity making exchange work
by generating trust and an interest in the welfare of other participants. Its sources are both internal and external: in the case of
the former, webs of interdependence created by the exchange relation itself; in the case of the latter, the sovereign law of contract.
Contract solidarity is seen by Macneil as the norm holding exchanges together; it is a necessary condition of the possibility of exchange. Its essential demands are mutuality or reciprocity and some
28.

R.

29.

I.

DWORKIN, supra

note 23.

MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
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evenness in exchange. The key question posed is: Will conditions
continue so that each of us will desire to and be able to depend on
the other? But to answer this question, we need something more
than the external aspect of Durkheim-Macneil; we need to consider
the hermeneutics of social solidarity also; and that takes us back to
Hume, Austin and Grice; to the two rowers and the Prisoners'
Dilemma; to conventional action, convention and Humean utility.
Social solidarity, and therefore contract solidarity, is
cooperative trust in a social context of partial hostility. In Humean
terms, it is greed controlling greed; it is reason-dependent; it involves a general sense of common interest.
In the beginning, says Macneil, was society, in the sense of the
smallest viable social unit. The natural social unit, according to
Hume, is the family. In a state with just such units (Macneil's beginning society) there is, according to Hume, no natural motive to act
justly, i.e., honestly, with respect to the property of strangers. A
modern society in Hume's sense-a state having the conventions of
property, promise and government-reflects the fact that individuals have great appetites but no natural advantages; and this
creates a need to unite. Societies, moreover, remedy three inconveniences: by joining forces we increase our productive power; by division of labor we are more able to perfect a craft or art; and collectively we are more secure. However, it is not sufficient for there to
be advantage in union; we must see what is wrong and see what
needs to be done. The union must be reason-dependent, rather than
accidental.
But how did we get from that very restricted type of social
order to the more extended and remote? How did we come to extend stability beyond the family? Hume answers:
By convention, a general sense of common interest; which
sense all members of the society express to one another,
and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe that it will be for my interest to
leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he
will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct.
When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed,
and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and
behavior. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement between us, tho' without the interposition of a promise;.since the actions of each of us have

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/4

Mulloch: The New Paradigm of Contract: A Hermeneutical Approach
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT

1983]

a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon
the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the
other part.'
It is therefore Humean convention that is the mechanism of social
solidarity.
According to Macneil, solidarity and reciprocity are essential to
the survival of human beings in society because people are inconsistently both selfish and social at the same time; they are in the
most fundamental sense of the word, irrational." But in that case,
how could they have evolved from people in nature to people in
society? Only, Hume argued, because they were rational as well as
selfish, Given greed and limited resources, we see that we would do
better in a state of society than in a state of nature. Greed controls
itself by "an alteration of its direction" so as to correct and regulate
itself; and this is reason-dependent. We see what is wrong with a
certain state of affairs and see what needs to be done. The social
union is therefore reason-dependent. How, then, could it be irrational for selfish people to be social?
Well, in deciding what to do, if faced with two alternatives,
there are the problems posed by the Prisoner's Dilemma and the
rower's dilemma; and if faced with three or more alternatives, the
problem of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.2 The latter states that
any process for making collective choices which satisfies six conditions is inconsistent in a certain sense. Those conditions are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Unanimity: if everyone prefers alternative A to alternative B, then A is society's choice.
Non-dictatorship: no one person's choice is controlling.
Scope: there must be at least three alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: only available alternatives may be considered.
Binary generation: alternatives are to be compared
pairwise.
Transitivity of Preference: if individual i prefers A to
B and B to C, then i prefers A to C.

Conditions 5 and 6 constitute social rationality; the inconsistency
referred to is social inconsistency in the sense of failure to satisfy 5
and 6. Conditions 5 and 6 also require condition 3: transitivity re30.
31.
32.

D. HUME, supra note 4, at 490.
I. MACNEIL, supra note 10, at 8 (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963).
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quires the binary comparison of at least three alternatives. The
theorem states that if the process for making social choices satisfies
conditions 1-4, then it cannot satisfy conditions 5 and 6; or, what
amounts to the same thing, it cannot satisfy conditions 1-6
simultaneously.
Condition 4 in effect requires that for any pair of alternatives,
in making a choice we consider only information concerning that
pair; it also ignores the intensity of the preferences of individuals
for their particular choices. Arguably, rationality of social choice requires that we consider both intensity of preferences and all possible alternatives rather than just all available alternatives. Thus, if
condition 4 is dropped, there is a way out of Arrow's paradox.
It should also be noted that Gibbard has shown that when
social choices are generated by voting schemes-i.e., schemes which
make social choice depend entirely on individuals' professed
preferences among the (at least three possible) alternatives -then if
the scheme is non-dictatorial, it is subject to individual
manipulation.' In the sense employed by Gibbard, an individual
"manipulates" a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his
preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome, i.e., the choice the community would make if he expressed his
true preferences.
Although the equilibrium outcome in the Prisoner's Dilemma is
not optimal, it is certainly not irrational "in the most fundamental
sense of the word"; and the same is true of the converse version of
the two rowers. In cases involving three or more alternatives, irrationality must be understood in the restricted sense of Arrow's
theorem, the plausibility of which depends on the plausibility of condition 4. When the nation-state is considered as an ongoing macrolevel exchange relation, it will be manifested most fundamentally in
social choices. So if condition 4 is dropped, the macro-level exchange
relation is as potentially rational as the micro-level exchange relation. Indeed, at the macro-level at which social choices would involve
exchange relations, it is difficult to see how any alternative could be
irrelevant.
We may conclude, therefore, that social solidarity reflects rationality rather than irrationality "in the most fundamental sense."

33.

Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41

ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973).
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THE NATURE OF AN EXCHANGE RELATION OBLIGATION

In relational contract, says Macneil, both the content and the
source of the obligations come from the relation itself, out of slowly
evolving patterns of custom and law, and tend to be diffuse and illdefined. Moreover, the ongoing relation itself creates obligations
just as it defines the content of the obligations." This kind of obligation is likened by Macneil to the sociologists' notion of commitment:
it grows out of the 'investment' in the relation (and the linking
norms of expectation, reliance and restitution?) made by the other
party. 5 This can be made more precise in the case of a conventional
action exchange relation.
In the case of those exchange relations based on promise, the
primary performance obligation is promissory. But what about those
exchange relations not based on promise, nor on status, role or kinship? What is the nature (source and content) of an obligation when
the 'obligating factor' is conventional action sans promise etc.?
The essence of conventional action, we recall, is inter-personal
mutuality of reference at the level of intentions, which requires
something of the form:
if you do (will do) something,
then I will do something.
It is thus a 'declaration' of intention sans promise, etc., manifested
by what is done. Consider the following:
(a) S says to H:
(b) H says to S:
(c) S replies (i)
(ii)

I'll be there.
Is that a promise?
Yes.
No.

Both responses in (c) are meaningful. In (c)(i), S's obligation is clearly
to be there; in (c)(ii) it is not. But it does not follow that S has no
obligation in (c)(ii). So the question is: In what way could S be
obligated in (c)(ii)? Consider (c)(i) again. The most that H is entitled
to expect is that S will be there. And if S does not show up, the
least that H is entitled to expect is an excuse-which, if unsatisfactory, would entitle H (and others) to rebuke S. Now consider (c)(ii). If
we do not have the convention of promise, the declaration falls into
the more general convention of language use in communication, the
obligation of which generally is truthfulness rather than the perfor34.
35.

I. MACNEIL, supra note 29, at 17.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, supra note 1 at 786.
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mance of some action in the future. So if S does not show up, either
(1) he did not speak truthfully, or (2) he changed his mind, or (3) he
was prevented from being there, or (4) he forgot. If (1), then S did
wrong and H is entitled to rebuke S. Responses (2) and (4) indicate
that S is unreliable: (2) may call for an excuse, while (4) is simply an
unsatisfactory explanation. In the case of (3), S will be excused if he
was prevented by circumstances beyond his control. But if H is not
entitled to (strongly) expect S to show up in (c)(ii), what more than
an explanation or excuse could H expect? Well, one could say that H
is at most entitled to expect something from S which is "more than"
an explanation or excuse but "less than" S's being there, such as an
indemnification, substitute, or alternative, e.g., S's sending someone
else in his place.
Thus, the source of the obligation imposed by exchange relation qua conventional action sans promise, etc., is the "declaration"
of intention (Gricean meaning) entailed by conventional action and
the truthfulness it requires; and its nature is that of indemnity,
substitute or alternative. This is compatible with part, at least, of
the wide range of remedies which Macneil associates with the relational contract, including not only compensatory damages, but also
mediation, arbitration and compromise. And if the exchange relation
is conditioned on good faith, then the expectation, reliance and
restitution interests associated with promise will also be protected.
Indeed, good faith is one of the underlying principles which requires
the protection of those interests, if not the underlying principle.
EXCHANGE RELATION AND GOOD FAITH

According to Macneil, norms are the way people do and ought
to behave; they are principles of right action. The basic norms or
principles of contract law "grow" out of the primal roots of contract.
Intermediate norms or principles "emerge" from the patterns of
basic contractual behavior and supply principles to test specific
rules of contract law and determine how the basic norms are to be
effectuated in given situations; they are general principles of justice
behind legal rules.' One such intermediate norm or principle of
right action in contractual behavior is that of good faith.
How does the norm or principle of good faith "emerge" from
the pattern of conventional action exchange relations? If the conventional action is also promissory or based on status, role, kinship or
gratitude, the good faith principle could reflect rules associated with
36.

I. MACNEIL, supra note 29, at 38-39.
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promise, status, role, kinship or positive morality. But what of conventional action sans promise, status, role, kinship or gratitude?
How does the principle of good faith "emerge" from a conventional
action exchange relation simpliciter in a social context of partial
hostility?
Let us refer once more to the pay-off matrix for the Rower's
Dilemma. The bottom right-hand corner (- 5, - 5) indicates that it
would be better for each on his own if he got across the river by
sharing the work. A classical promissory agreement is not a solution
because each rower would have the same motive for not rowing he
had sans agreement (A (0, - 10); B (- 10, 0)): let the other do the
work. Moreover, the appointment of a third party authorized to enforce the agreement would not alter this. Rather, as we noted, the
solution is conventional action sans promise. Cooperation is maintained (negatively) by each party's readiness to use the sanction of
non-cooperation: if and only if you row, I will row. In a more
positive sense we may also say that cooperation will be maintained
as long as each party acts in good faith, i.e., puts his weight behind
the oar. Thus, the possibility of sanctions-internal or external-is
not of itself sufficient to maintain cooperation. Rather, the possibility
of sanctions serves to remind us that, as a practical matter, the relation will not persist without good faith on both sides.
Macneil links good faith to procedural regularity. 7 This suggests that the emergence of the good faith norm may be susceptible
to an explanation along the (Platonic-Aristotelian) lines of Fuller's
notion of the morality of law." The social context of partial hostility
obviously of itself entails little in the way of good faith. Rather, it is
reason that demands it: good faith is a rational constraint on partial
hostility qua social context of cooperative conventional action.
From a conative stand point, conventional cooperative action is
purposive and an exchange relation is a means-end relation; as such,
they belong to the realm of practice rather than the realm of theory.
For Plato and Aristotle, practice is concerned with purposive
behavior, the means-end relation between actions and outcomes, the
rules, conventions and principles of conduct. A practice or craft may
involve either
(i)
(ii)

37.
38.

doing something, the means, ordered to some end; or
doing something, the means, producing an instrument
for attaining some end.
Id. at 68.
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969).
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In either case, the practice will have its principles, rules or directives. Those principles may be likened to a recipe for making
something:
If you want to attain (or make an instrument for attaining)
a certain end, then you ought to do so and so.
This sort of hypothetical directive-principle is determined solely by
the means-end relation; it is immanent to the craft or practice; it exists solely by virtue of the means-end relation and does not reflect
matters external to that relation. Given the means-end relation, the
relevant principles are necessary hypothetical directives or rules for
a certain kind of purposive behavior and conformity to them imparts
to the means (and instrument) certain necessary characteristics: the
end, as we say, justifies and explains the means.
But the principles of the practice and so the characteristics of
the means (and instrument) resulting from conformity to those principles are not logically necessary because we cannot determine what
they are until certain presuppositions and assumptions are made
about the end in view, assumptions other than that the means
works, that the end eventuates, assumptions and presuppositions going to the sort of end envisaged and so to the way in which the end
is to be realized. Nor are they causally necessary characteristics. It
may be true that doing so-and-so is the cause of satisfying the desire
for the end. And when doing so-and-so produces something instrumental for attaining the end, that instrumentality itself is not
the cause of satisfying the desire for the end. Given the practice,
however, we can say that the principles and the characteristics imparted to the means (and instrument) are practically, though neither
logically nor causally, necessary; and the presuppositions and
assumptions about the end desired are the reasons why the end
justifies the means (and instrument), and are the determinants of
the kind of principles and the characteristics imparted to the
39
means.
An exchange relation may be thought of as a practice or
means-end relation involving conventional action as means and
cooperation as end. The only presuppositions or assumptions regarding the end are a social setting consisting of the four primal roots
in a context of partial hostility. Good faith may then be thought of
as an internal principle of procedural regularity, a principle immanent to an exchange relation, a hypothetical directive to the participants:
39.

See Mullock, The Inner Morality of Law, 84 ETHICS 327 (1974).
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If you each want to attain ongoing cooperation, then you
each ought to recognize the expectation and reliance interests of the other.

Otherwise the exchange relation will not persist, i.e., its temporal
dimension makes good faith a practical necessity.
If partial hostility means that complete good faith on both sides
is an ideal, then good faith may be regarded as a norm of aspiration
rather than of duty. Given the antecedent if-clause, however, the
ought becomes unconditional and socially binding, a social and rational limitation on selfishness. And if the exchange relation persists, the conventional action involved will be characterized by some
degree of good faith.
CONCLUSIONS

The hermeneutical approach adopted herein yields the notions
of a Gricean intended exchange and Humean conventional action
such that every case of the former entails the latter, while the latter
does not entail promises. A Gricean intended exchange therefore
goes beyond classical contract theory. However it does not embrace
those section 90 transactions in which the promise is unconditional
and the social context insufficient to impart the Gricean meaningintentions necessary for conventional action. Nor does it cover those
section 90 transactions in which the promise is conditioned on
gratitude for past favors. Since there are no such restrictions on
Macneil's exchange relation, its nature cannot be completely captured at the micro-level by a conventional-action exchange relation.
Similarly, the generality of the obligation of a Macneil exchange
relation cannot be completely accounted for by the relative generaiity
of the obligation of a Gricean intended exchange. This unboundedness reflects Macneil's belief that the concept of an
autonomous individual is not a useful tool for social analysis.
At the macro-level at which the nation-state is viewed as a
massive ongoing exchange relation, the Hume-Lewis notion of convention seems preferable to Fuller's section 90 concept as a model
for the complementary expectancies involved in customary law qua
a program for living together within the framework provided by
enacted law. Convention, moreover, may serve as the mechanism of
social solidarity and the guarantor of its rationality.
In the case of exchange relations not based on promise, status,
role or kinship, i.e., a "pure" conventional action exchange relation,
the source of the obligation is the "declaration" of Gricean intention,
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i.e., utterer's meaning, entailed by conventional action and the
truthfulness it requires; and its nature is that of indemnity,
substitute or alternative. Furthermore, if such exchange relations
are to persist, the conventional action involved will be characterized
by some degree of good faith as a matter of practical, rather than
logical or causal, necessity.
As for those Macneil micro-level exchange relations which are
not conventional action exchange relations, neither the source of the
obligation, nor the source of the good faith norm can be accounted
for by the hermeneutical approach adopted herein.
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